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1 Introduction1
At the heart of behavioral and experimental economics is the goal to better understand be-
havior through observation so that economic models can be improved. However, despite the
predictions of classical economics, the researcher is often confronted with a great deal of behav-
ioral heterogeneity. One way to approach this heterogeneity is to acknowledge that decision
makers differ from each other in fundamental ways and these differences contribute to the
differences in observed economic behavior.
Advances have been made in understanding strategic behavior by studying the existence
and implications of behavioral heterogeneity in games.2 A different strand of literature seeks
to better understand the heterogenous cognitive processes that underlie economic behavior.3
However, another strand of literature explores whether the observed heterogeneity is associated
with the cognitive ability of the subjects. As such, many researchers have examined the
∗We are grateful to more than 50 referees who provided very insightful comments and suggestions on the
original submissions and subsequent revisions of the articles included in this special issue. Ofer Azar provided
helpful comments on this intoduction.
†Middlesex University London, Economics Department, The Burroughs, London, NW4 4BT, UK; Email:
branasgarza@gmail.com.
‡Rutgers University-Camden, Department of Economics, 311 North 5th Street, Camden, New Jersey, USA
08102; Email: smithj@camden.rutgers.edu.
1It is beyond the scope of this introduction (and this Special Issue) to provide a thorough review of the
literature on cognitive abilities and economic behavior. However, we note that the literature has progressed
to the point that an exhaustive review that is designed for economists would be helpful. See Rustichini (2015)
for a literature review designed for non-economists.
2Camerer et al. (2004), Costa-Gomes et al. (2001), Costa-Gomes and Crawford, (2006), Costa-Gomes
and Weizsacker (2008), Crawford et al. (2013), McKelvey and Palfrey (1995), Nagel (1995), Rey-Biel (2009),
Slonim (2005), Stahl and Wilson (1994), Stahl and Wilson (1995), Weber (2001), and Weber (2003).
3Agranov et al. (2015), Agranov et al. (2012), Allred et al. (2014), Burchardi and Penczynski (2014),
Cappelletti et al. (2011), Coricelli and Nagel (2009), Coricelli and Nagel (2012), Crawford (2008), Duffy and
Smith (2014), Schulz et al. (2014), and Wang et al. (2010).
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relationship between a measure of the cognitive ability of the subject and their economic
behavior.4
2 This Special Issue
In this Special Issue (SI), we offer twelve papers that exemplify cutting edge research on cog-
nitive abilities and economic behavior. In particular, these papers improve our understanding
of economic behavior by considering the role of cognitive ability. Despite this common goal,
the papers contained in this SI are heterogenous. For instance, the papers contained in this
SI study economic behavior in a variety of settings (strategic and non-strategic, field studies
and laboratory studies, etc.).
At the outset, we declare that the term cognitive ability is used here (and throughout the
SI) in a broad sense. The measures of cognitive ability include well-known measures, such
as the Cognitive Reflection Test (CRT; Frederick, 2005)5 and the Raven Progressive Matrices
(Raven, 1936; Raven, Raven and Court, 2000). On the other hand, papers in this SI also
employ less-standard measures of cognitive ability, including success at a strategic board game
(Baghestanian and Frey, 2016), a working memory test and an arithmetic test (Prokosheva,
2016), Faith in Intuition (Alo´s-Ferrer and Hu¨gelscha¨fer, 2016), the Red Hat puzzle (Bayer and
Renou, 2016a), and success in the Hit 15 game (Rustichini, DeYoung, Anderson, and Burks,
2016).
We have organized the SI in the following manner. The first six papers focus on the
question of how measures of cognitive abilities are related to behavior in relatively simple
4As a non-exhaustive list of references, see Andersson et al. (2016), Ballinger et al. (2011), Bayer and
Renou (2016b), Beauchamp et al. (2011), Benjamin et al. (2013), Ben-Ner et al. (2004), Borghans et al.
(2008), Bran˜as-Garza et al. (2012), Bran˜as-Garza et al. (2011), Bran˜as-Garza et al. (2008), Brandsta¨tter
and Gu¨th (2002), Burks et al. (2009), Burnham et al. (2009), Carpenter et al. (2013), Chen et al. (2013),
Chen et al. (2014), Cokely and Kelley (2009), Cubel and Sanchez-Pages (2014), Dave et al. (2010), Devetag
and Warglien (2003), Dohmen et al. (2010), Fehr and Huck (2016), Geng et al. (2015), Georganas et al.
(2015), Gill and Prowse (2016), Grimm and Mengel (2012), Hanaki et al. (2016), Jones (2008), Jones (2014),
Millet and Dewitte (2007), Oechssler et al. (2009), Palacios-Huerta (2003), Palacios-Huerta and Volij (2009),
Ponti and Rodriguez-Lara (2015), Proto et al. (2014), Putterman et al. (2011), Rydval and Ortmann (2004),
Schnusenberg and Gallo (2011), Shamosh et al. (2008), Shamosh and Gray (2008), Stanovich and West (2008),
Taylor (2013), Taylor (2016), and Toplak et al. (2011).
5See Toplak et al. (2011) and Bran˜as-Garza et al. (2016) for meta-analyses. Bosch-Dome`nech et al. (2014)
find that CRT scores are related to fetal exposure to testosterone.
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games (prisoner’s dilemma, trust, public goods) or relatively complicated games (bank runs
and Schelling games). The last six papers combine a well-known measure of cognitive ability
(for instance, the CRT) with a measure that is novel to the economics literature (Faith in
Intuition, irreflection, and personality measures).
2.1 Cognitive abilities and behavior in games
We begin with Benito-Ostolaza, Herna´ndez, and Sanchis-Llopis (2016). These authors study
the relationship between cognitive ability and behavior in a complicated Schelling game.
Benito-Ostolaza et al. find that subjects with a higher measure on the 60 item Raven test also
make a larger number of optimal strategic actions. Hence subjects with a higher cognitive
ability are more likely to play their Nash Equilibrium strategy.
Kiss, Rodriguez-Lara, and Rosa-Garc´ıa (2016) observe behavior in a sequential bank run
game, where it is a dominant strategy for the final player to not withdraw funds. However, the
experiment manipulates the extent to which this is transparent to the subject, by implementing
a strategic uncertainty treatment and a no strategic uncertainty treatment. The authors find
that for subjects in the strategic uncertainty treatment, higher CRT scores are associated
with fewer withdrawals. However, in the more transparent treatment, they do not find a
relationship between CRT scores and withdrawals. In other words, higher cognitive ability
subjects are more strategic than lower cognitive ability subjects, but only in relatively opaque
strategic settings.6
Whereas the first two papers show that subjects with higher cognitive abilities are more
likely to play rationally, the following papers find the opposite in games where behavior is
affected by social preferences. For instance, Corgnet, Esp´ın, Herna´n-Gonza´lez, Kujal, and
Rassenti (2016) measure cognitive ability with the CRT and observe behavior in a trust game.
The authors find a positive relationship between cognitive ability and trust, suggesting that
higher cognitive ability subjects are more likely to play dominant strategies in the presence
of social preferences. However, this relationship does not appear to be driven by preferences
toward risk. Further, the authors do not find a relationship between cognitive ability and
6Also see Bran˜as-Garza et al. (2012).
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trustworthy behavior.
Lohse (2016) finds that subjects with higher CRT scores contribute more in a one-shot
public goods game. In order to better understand this result, the author also employs a
computer treatment (where there is not a pro-social benefit from contributing) and a time
pressure treatment. The author does not find a relationship between CRT and contributions
in either the computer treatment or the time pressure treatment. This suggests that the
contributions from the high CRT subjects are deliberative and motivated by social preferences.
However, it remains to be seen if the results are due to the preference for efficiency or some
other mechanism.
When the experimenter observes behavior in a strategic setting it is often difficult to
distinguish among the possibilities that the subject lacked the capacity for strategic thought,
that the subject exhibited a lack of sophistication because there was a perceived lack of
sophistication of the opponent, or that the subject was affected by social preferences. In
response to this, Bayer and Renou (2016a) study a setting in which subjects engage in a
strategic interaction with computers programmed to play optimally and the subjects were
made aware of this fact. This setting (Red Hat puzzle) avoids both the confounds of the
expectation of sophistication of the opponent and the effects of social preferences. The authors
vary the complexity of the setting and find that subjects perform better in less complicated
strategic settings. It would seem that researchers could employ this technique to measure the
strategic skills of subjects in order to better understand their behavior in other settings.
Al-Ubaydli, Jones, and Weel (2016) study the cognitive ability of subjects in a finitely
repeated prisoner’s dilemma game. Rather than only considering the cognitive ability of the
subject, the authors also consider the cognitive ability of the matched pair. Al-Ubaydli et al.
do not find a relationship between the subject’s cognitive ability and cooperation, however
they find a relationship between the cognitive ability of the matched pair and cooperation.
This result suggests that high cognitive ability subjects are not necessarily more pro-social,
but that high cognitive ability matches are better able to coordinate on cooperation.
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2.2 Correlates of cognitive ability with other measures
Alo´s-Ferrer and Hu¨gelscha¨fer (2016) study the CRT measure, the less well-known (in eco-
nomics) Faith in Intuition measure, and their associations with well-known biases. Whereas
higher CRT scores imply success in making quantitative responses, Faith in Intuition is a
self-reported measure of the subject’s disposition toward automatic, rather than reflective,
judgments. The authors find that neither measure outperforms the other and that both can
be helpful in different settings. The authors challenge researchers to think hard about the spe-
cific feature that is being measured by any technique, and to strive for improved techniques.
This challenge only becomes more urgent as the efficacy of CRT diminishes with exposure,
and many future experimental participants are familiar with the test.7
Baghestanian and Frey (2016) study the differences in the predictions of two different
measures of cognitive ability in various strategic settings. The authors use a ranking in the
board game GO as a measure of strategic ability and the outcomes of the CRT as a measure
of analytic ability. The authors find that strategic ability is associated with playing the Nash
actions but analytic ability is associated with playing the efficient, cooperative actions. The
results of this paper offer a caution to regarding cognitive ability as undifferentiated. Further,
their findings offer a challenge to researchers to think more carefully about employing measures
of cognitive ability.
Cueva et al. (2016) study CRT outcomes and its relationships with both economic prefer-
ences (risk aversion and social preferences) and psychological measures. In addition to simply
considering the number of CRT questions correctly answered, the authors also consider the
number of CRT questions answered in the intuitive but incorrect manner. The authors refer
to subjects that perform well on the CRT as reflective, and those that respond with the intu-
itive but incorrect answer as impulsive. The authors find that male subjects tend to be less
impulsive.8 They also find evidence that reflective subjects exhibit less risk aversion than
impulsive subjects; however, this result is sensitive to the elicitation technique. The authors
also find evidence that CRT outcomes are related to personality measures. Additionally, the
7See Toplak et al. (2011) and Bran˜as-Garza et al. (2016).
8Also see, Bran˜as-Garza et al. (2016).
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authors find a correlation between the CRT outcomes and personality measures, which begs
the question of exactly what does CRT measure.
Prokosheva (2016) investigates the relationship between ambiguity aversion and the reduc-
tion of compound lotteries, and whether this relationship is affected by the cognitive ability
of the subject. The author employs two measures of cognitive ability: a working memory test
and an arithmetic test. Similar to the literature, the author finds a relationship between am-
biguity aversion and the reduction of compound lotteries. However this relationship is affected
by measures of cognitive ability and the presentation of the lotteries. These results suggest
that modeling a close relationship between ambiguity aversion and the reduction of compound
lotteries could be problematic.
Studies of investment decisions often have the problem that funds available for investment
are correlated with both observed and unobserved heterogeneity. However, Insler, Compton,
and Schmitt (2016) study a setting in which every student at the United States Naval Academy
was an offered extremely low interest rate loan. The setting provides a unique opportunity to
study investment decisions when the liquidity constraint is relaxed, regardless of background.
The authors employ measures of cognitive ability that are common in the economics literature
in addition to personality measures (Myers-Briggs Type Indicator). The authors find that
students with higher measures of cognitive ability (CRT, SAT, and GPA) invest more of the
borrowed funds and the personality measures are associated with investing decisions.
Finally, Rustichini, DeYoung, Anderson, and Burks (2016) have access to various life out-
comes (body mass index, smoking status, credit score, etc.) and laboratory observations (risk
aversion, impatience, strategic behavior) of subjects training to become truck drivers.9 Here
the authors use variables commonly employed by economists (measures of cognitive ability and
demographic information) in addition to personality measures that are not often employed by
economists. It is perhaps surprising to economists that the authors find that the personal-
ity measures are significantly related to the dependent variables, even in specifications that
include the standard economics variables. The authors hope that their work will encourage
economists to be open to any variable that can be helpful in improving predictions of behavior.
9Also see Burks, Carpenter, Go¨tte, and Rustichini (2009, 2012)
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3 Discussion
A number of insights are common across the papers in this SI. For instance, subjects with
higher measures of cognitive ability are more likely to play Nash Equilibrium in games where
behavior is not affected by social preferences. However, the opposite appears to be the case
in games where behavior is affected by social preferences. Also, we have seen that measures
of cognitive ability are not identical to other inventories. Further, certain measures are corre-
lated with personality types and even with genetic inheritance, although this is perhaps not
surprising given that recent papers have shown that preferences are affected by conditions
present even before the birth of the subject.10 We are excited to present this SI of the Journal
of Behavioral and Experimental Economics, as we expect that the insights contained in these
papers will stimulate exciting research in the future.
10See Bran˜as-Garza and Rustichini (2011) for a discussion on risk preferences and see Apicella et al. (2015)
for an overview of the literature.
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